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Abstract: Capital works procurement and its regulatory policy environment within a country 
can be complex entities. For example, by virtue of Australia’s governmental division between 
the Commonwealth, states and local jurisdictions and the associated procurement networks 
and responsibilities at each level, the tendering process is often convoluted. There are four 
inter-related key themes identified in the literature in relation to procurement disharmony, 
including decentralisation, risk & risk mitigation, free trade & competition, and tendering 
costs. This paper defines and discusses these key areas of conflict that adversely impact upon 
the business environments of industry through a literature review, policy analysis and 
consultation with capital works procurement stakeholders.  
 
The aim of this national study is to identify policy differences between jurisdictions in 
Australia, and ascertain whether those differences are a barrier to productivity and 
innovation. This research forms an element of a broader investigation with an aim of 
developing efficient, effective and nationally harmonised procurement systems.  
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1. Background 
 
This research has been conducted by the University of Newcastle, Australia, as part of the 
Cooperative Research Centre for Construction Innovation (CRC-CI). The impact of policy 
harmony on the construction industry business environment and its effects on the ability for 
organisations to be productive and innovative was identified as a key area for investigation 
that had been lacking in Australian construction research. This was based upon numerous 
industry studies over the last decade that have identified the property and construction 
industry as one of the most over-regulated industries in Australia. The studies also showed 
that the construction industry displayed a disharmonised policy and regulatory framework 
(Bell, 1996; PM, 1997; Productivity Commission, 2004).  
 
For the purposes of this study, procurement is focussed on Capital Works Project 
Procurement, which refers to the organisational strategy within which a building or civil 
infrastructure project will be realised, acquired or obtained and the ensuing contractual 
relationships between government client and major parties. The key themes distilled from a 
literature review and anecdotal industry evidence outlined in this paper coupled with a 
corresponding policy analysis have been the basis for formulating a research methodology to 
survey and interview relevant government and industry stakeholders. This paper discusses the 
theoretical issues surrounding procurement policy harmony and suggests a framework for a 
procurement policy investigation in Australia in the context of international studies.  
 
During the foundational stages of this project it was necessary to consult with representatives 
from the procurement industry to determine key areas of concern. As a CRC-CI partner and a 
large multinational industry representative, John Holland Group (JHG) was well placed to 
inform researchers of the difficulties and successes in working with procurement policy 
across federal, state and local jurisdictions. With JHG’s collaboration and a pilot survey of 
seven senior executives of the company it was identified that they experience procurement 
policy differences between state jurisdictions, between state and the Federal systems, and 
even within a state. It was also identified that particular methods of project procurement and 
their interpretation by government employees differed, particularly design-and-construct and 
public-private partnership strategies. The impacts upon the business efficiency of the firms 
included increased time to complete tenders and ensure compliance, wasted time as similar 
tender documentation needed to be restructured, innovative tenders were misunderstood, and 
tendering costs were higher due to retraining of staff and time overruns. 
 
This pilot material provided a useful context to understand the background to the literature 
review outlined in this paper and the policy document analysis that has been completed as 
part of the study; together these three activities assist in the direction of the study design and 
validated the rationale and significance of the investigation. 
 
2. Key Themes of Policy Harmony – A Literature Review 
 
A literature review of construction management and economics literature has indicated that 
potential barriers to (or catalysts for) innovation and their attribution to policy and procedures 
can be distilled to four key themes – decentralisation (Egan, 1998; Latham, 1994; Kelman, 
1990), risk & risk mitigation (Sharp & Tinsley, 2005; Williamson, 2004; Jaggar et al, 1991), 
free trade & competition (Arrowsmith, 1995; Uttley & Hartley, 1994), and tendering costs 
(Kumaraswamy et al, 2005; Wood, 2006; English & Guthrie, 2003). Each of these is now 
discussed. 
 
 
2.1 Decentralisation and devolution of responsibility 
 
The UK construction industry has been subject to a century of periodically intense scrutiny 
with a view to improving policies and procedures, and fostering innovation. Two more recent 
investigative reports, Constructing the Team (Latham, 1994) and Rethinking Construction 
(Egan, 1998), are habitually cited in literature regarding any facet of construction industry 
reform. A key concern (reiterated in subsequent literature) is the effect of decentralization. 
Previously a monolithic procurement client (Latham, 1994) with centralized purchasing 
institutions, the UK government has devolved responsibility to subordinate public authorities 
with the aim of increasing flexibility and competition.  
 
Analysis of the current procurement authority environment in Australia similarly has to deal 
with decentralization and its effects; already the sheer number of policy documents between 
states and the commonwealth is overwhelming – analysis and industry anecdotes reveal 
further ‘tailoring’ by individual procurement bodies of the non-prescriptive guidelines that 
creates barriers to innovation.  Where ‘government has ceased to be a single procurer… the 
untying of Departments from [a central procurement agency] has resulted in the emergence of 
a wide range of procurement techniques’ (Latham, 1994). The greater the number of 
procurement bodies, the greater the requirement for individualised policies; inherently, more 
methods means more conflict and confusion, and greater avenue for exploitation. 
Additionally, a popular perception exists that managerial success can be measured in terms of 
the change a manager enforces during their tenure. Procurement policy is perhaps an easy 
target for ‘streamlining’ or tailoring to improve the efficiency of a particular government 
entity for the appearance of such change, to the detriment of policy harmony. 
 
Decentralization can also lead to the diminution of in-house professional skills (Latham, 
1994). The devolution of responsibility from a central government core to individual entities 
creates a corresponding dilution of skill sets and experience; the effects on in-house skills, 
education and the iterative learning process are pronounced. Breaking apart central 
procurement bodies necessarily involves fragmentation of corporate knowledge; unless 
rigorous training regimes are established for passing on accumulated knowledge and 
practices, dilution of core skill sets is likely to result. This can have positive implications, 
especially when ingrained practices are root cause of stifled innovation, efficiency or 
burdensome red-tape. The negative results are more obvious and immediate, however; 
increased stress as unfamiliar employment responsibilities are forced on workers (and its 
flow on effects), fractured methodologies, perpetual reinvention of the wheel and so on. The 
loss of in-house skills leaves clients variously vulnerable to exploitation or so cautious as to 
necessarily inhibit innovation. High staff turnover within individual Public Sector bodies, and 
the cyclically shifting political agenda are further cause for concern. Already an industry that 
suffers from instability due to the unique nature of every project and fragmented stakeholder 
environment, decentralization and the consequent proliferation of varied procurement 
practices further removes foundational standards. The benefits primarily reaped through 
standardization and experience are difficult to achieve in project procurement when policies 
are multivalent and competitive tendering discourages familiarity. Put simply, standardization 
‘can provide much greater predictability about what is performed, by whom, how and when’ 
(Egan, 1998). 
 
The criticism of decentralization, however, does not constitute a call for the reintroduction of 
a central procurement body. The ‘delegation of authority within the public sector to those 
best placed to assess local needs’ (Latham, 1994) is well supported. What is identified, 
however, is a need for more robust monitoring and standardization of practices, and adequate 
education and training for those with whom the new procurement responsibilities are 
divested.  
 
The Egan Report builds on the research and results of the Latham Report with an aim to 
make the UK construction industry as a whole demonstrate the internationally renowned 
excellence evidenced by elite but non-indicative construction sectors. Low profit margins, 
lack of investment in research and development, and a flagging training regime are cited as 
prime barriers to construction innovation (Egan, 1998). In discussing drivers for change, 
committed leadership is seen as a primary progenitor for innovative change (Egan, 1998). 
Considering the devolution of procurement responsibility to managers not intrinsically 
motivated toward procurement innovation (ie beyond the terms of their usual employment, 
interest or skill set), the ability for the procurement environment to foster committed 
leadership is, at times, questionable. What intrinsic motivation is there for a manager within 
the health department, with a background and interest in healthcare provision, for example, to 
grapple with the nuances of procurement policy across different jurisdictions? Whilst a 
singular example, it is argued that long-lasting committed leadership requires some intrinsic 
motivation toward the project itself. 
 
The transition from rigid rule-based procurement methodology to a value-based system that 
enables the exercise of discretion in procurement spending and the consequent benefits for 
innovation and value-for-money have been well documented in United States procurement 
reforms and practice (Kelman, 1991). However, ‘Procurement reform sought to reduce rules, 
hierarchy and specialization, not to eliminate them… Rules can help produce good decisions 
that can help an organization do its substantive job better. If an organization has learned that 
certain approaches to dealing with recurring situations work, it can use rules to codify and 
transmit such information’ (Kelman, 2005).  
 
 
2.2 Risk + Risk Mitigation 
Risk is an inherent component of the procurement tendering process. The allocation of risk 
can be cause for great tension amongst client and tenderer. At the very least, innovation or 
the intention to innovate can be seen as too great a risk for a tenderer in a competitive 
environment. The cost of innovation in terms of risk can be manifold. Firstly, it might 
generally entail greater cost to the client initially, thus provoking an unfavourable response 
during the competitive tender process (where ‘best value’ is a subjective term, price is more 
tangible). The high costs of tendering (Dalrymple et al, 2006) conceivably limit the 
willingness to risk innovation itself through fear of not winning the elusive contract. 
Secondly, the innovative tenderer is also more likely to be experienced in government 
procurement processes and therefore be savvy in risk allocation; this could be seen as 
detrimental in a competitive environment, where other tenderers are more naïve in the 
acceptance of risk. Thirdly, innovation as an unknown quantity is an inherently risky 
business, especially for the client. Fear of the unknown, and the very real and high cost of 
failure in the construction environment must increase the tendency to accept tried and tested 
methodologies. In the politically competitive public sector, conservative procurement 
practices are likely to be the mainstay for fear of retribution. There seems to be an obvious 
but poorly addressed need to develop trust in partnerships rather than bargaining for 
individual gain (Jaggar, et al, 2001). Critical to this development is the notion of information 
opacity as distinct from transparency; whilst the latter is needed for the evolution of trust, the 
former still predominates. 
 
Acknowledgement of these attributes surrounding risk and innovation (in conjunction with 
many other issues) has seen the evolution of Public/Private Partnerships (PPP), Private 
Finance Initiatives (PFI) and Privately Financed Projects (PFP).  Despite overt intentions to 
share risk in a fairer and transparent manner, policies on risk allocation in PPP vary between 
jurisdictions. The state of Victoria has been the leader in fostering PPP relationships and 
consequently developing policy for PPP instigation and management. Other states and 
territories have absorbed Victoria’s advances into their own policies, and 2003 saw the 
inaugural National PPP Forum with aims to ‘deliver better coordination, information sharing 
and support among Australian governments in relation to PPP projects’ (Sharp & Tinsley, 
2005).  In spite of  
 
…various technical and terminology differences, there is a tendency towards 
homogeneity. Such a homogeneous approach has benefits to both the public and 
private sectors by way of increased certainty and lower transaction costs. (Sharp 
& Tinsley, 2005) 
 
If there is an acknowledged tendency and advance toward uniformity, and differences in risk 
allocation are minor or technical (in a legal sense), the question must be asked why there is 
any difference at all. For example, Why not use Victoria’s acknowledged experience and skill 
as a basis for standardization and replication of PPP policy across jurisdictions, at least at the 
state level? The requirement for additional in-house or ad hoc addendums indicates the 
difficulty of formulating encompassing policy guidelines without being so general as to be 
superfluous, and also the potential for multitudinous additions to policy on a department by 
department, state by state manner that would further confuse an already convoluted 
regulatory environment. Preliminary information obtained from industry partners for this 
project suggests that PPPs are currently a root cause of regulatory disharmony between 
jurisdictions, due either to differences in methodology selection, implementation, 
management, experience or outlay costs. 
 
Partnering, or project alliancing, is raised as a positive step forward in procurement conduct 
(Egan, 1998). A diversion from traditional procurement methods, partnering involves the 
selection of a small and dedicated professional team (client, designers, contractors, 
construction managers) who agree on design, risk management and dispute resolution issues 
and share profits and losses evenly. Contractual obligations are minimized, if no not 
abolished entirely. For its acclaimed successes, however, partnering is a difficult procurement 
option to instate and maintain, and generally requires a culture shift amongst participants 
used to the adversarial nature of the construction environment (Egan, 1998). At present, 
Australian procurement policy does not mandate methodologies for construction, and leaves 
the choice (within broad guidelines) with the procurer. Considering the difficulties of 
implementing partnering and (despite its potential rewards) a consequent tendency to avoid 
additional complexity, impetus to ingrain partnering or project alliancing as an appropriate 
alternative methodology may be aided by policy intervention. Whilst the promotion of 
PPP/PFI and Project alliancing signals ‘the current preoccupation… with non-legislative 
solutions to the problem of opportunism through the development of more trusting relations 
between participants’ (Williamson et al, 2004, p63), perhaps there is scope for legislative 
solutions to improve exposure to a valuable alternative procurement methodology.  
 
As a generalized extension of partnering as discussed here, long-term relationships in 
procurement are heralded as a boon to innovation and improvement. Unfortunately, they are 
also rare (Egan, 1998, p29). Benefits of long term relationships seem obvious, yet the already 
discussed fragmentary nature of the construction industry does not promote longevity. 
Importantly for this review, however, the present policy environment also seems to mitigate 
against the long term relationship; lack of standardization, niche procurement practices 
brought about through decentralization and an overarching emphasis on competition creates a 
culture of short term thinking. 
 
 
2.3 Free trade + competition 
 
Uttley & Hartley (1994) discuss procurement policy in the fluid and volatile regulatory 
environment leading up to the establishment of a European Union (EU) single European 
market. Problems are identified with governments of individual states historically looking 
after the interests of state players at the expense of free and diverse trade. Similarities can be 
seen within the Australian context; replacing the ‘Single European Market’ with 
‘Commonwealth of Australia’, and ‘European States’ with ‘Australian States and Territories’ 
is a beneficial analytical tool. English and Guthrie (2003) enunciate a similar sentiment in 
discussing privately financed projects (PFPs), whereby ‘in Australia it is not possible to talk 
about one initiative in the singular tense. Because of our federal system, we essentially have 
seven different PFP initiatives’ (English & Guthrie, 2003). New South Wales state 
procurement policy, for example, still has industry preference schemes to benefit country 
NSW suppliers, and Australia-New Zealand partnerships that place a substantial (20%) price 
loading on non-ANZ applications when tenders are being refereed (NSW Government 
Procurement Policy, 2004). Other states have similar policies that promote the use of local 
resources in the tender evaluation process. States such as Western Australia (Government of 
Western Australia, 2002) and South Australia (Government of South Australia: State 
Procurement Board, 2005) use a similar 20% loading on foreign resources in tenders, while 
Queensland Procurement Policy states the need for evaluation of contribution to advancement 
of government priorities (Queensland Department of Public Works, 2004). This signals a 
conflict between Commonwealth and State policy guidelines, and could cause corresponding 
confusion amongst tenderers. More importantly it is potentially at odds with various free 
trade agreements imposed by the Commonwealth and purportedly adopted by the states and 
territories, and finds resonance with problems raised in the literature discussing EU formation 
tribulations, where the aim of ‘public procurement policy in the EU was to dispel 
discrimination and government protectionism in public procurement, viewed as one of the 
major barriers to the achievement of the Internal Market’ (Erridge et al, 1998).  
 
Arrowsmith (1995) raises pertinent research questions for considering Australia’s approach 
to procurement in relation to notions of free trade. Using ‘reforms’ in European Community 
procurement policy as case studies, beneficial comparators are found for evaluating 
procurement policy at different government levels and its implications on ‘free trade’ 
between states and territories. Important issues regarding policy as an instrument for social 
change are raised at a more philosophical or theoretical level, issues that have not really been 
considered in Australian-focused literature reviewed to date. The belief that free trade in 
procurement is the way forward are counteracted with examples where a more restrictive 
procurement policy is better placed to shape and monitor social policy (anti-discrimination 
for example), national industrial and technological objectives and state aid. Review of 
Australian policy with respect to these issues may lead to further research avenues regarding 
the (at present) seemingly unquestioned nature and theoretical makeup of procurement policy 
that affect the construction industry, in addition to the more practical and tangible barriers to 
innovation. 
 
In an open market, policies which are merely protectionist are obviously 
unacceptable, but the EC rules also appear unsympathetic to the use of 
procurement to promote other goals, even those which the Community accepts 
sometimes require a compromise of free competition through, for example, the 
provision of state aid. (Arrowsmith, 1995) 
 
The underlying competitive foundations of free trade provide a neat segue into a discussion 
of competition and competitive tendering in capital works procurement. Whilst ‘best value’ 
may have replaced compulsory competitive tendering as procurement weapon of choice, the 
belief that competition is the best driver for advancement is still a fundamental component of 
procurement policy. Egan argues that ‘the repeated selection of new teams… inhibits 
learning, innovation and the development of skilled and experienced teams’ (Egan, 1998, 
p19). Continuity is vital in developing product identity, enhancing production methods, 
refining quality and exceeding customer expectations (Egan, 1998, p20). Added to the fray is 
the somewhat liberally interpreted notion of ‘best value’ in procurement. As the foundational 
clause of procurement nationally, the subjective nature of best value (despite its advances 
from initial CCT where cost was the only consideration) spawns extensive guidelines, 
methodology and balances in order to make the process more transparent and less vulnerable 
to exploitation. As the Hon Peter Slipper suggested in 2003, we ‘probably need to elaborate 
on the concept of ‘value for money’, because it can mean different things to different 
people’. When value for money is the stated core principle of the Commonwealth 
Procurement Guidelines, this admitted subjectivity in assessment seems at face value to 
inherently undermine aims of objectivity in the procurement process.  
 
The tender process is vulnerable to manipulation by all parties. It is protected to 
some extent by the general legislation against gross misdemeanours such as 
fraud, and by more special legislation against anti-competitive behaviour such 
as collusion. The Code currently falls outside the legislative framework, rather 
offering suggestions of appropriate individual behaviour – leaving the “invisible 
hand” of market competition to provide the long-term economic solution. 
(Williamson, et al, 2004, p66)  
 
 
2.4 Cost of tendering 
It is noted that the following discussion is presented as it relates more to procurement policy 
by governments as clients and their ethical responsibilities in their role as initiators of 
projects. The literature and discussion does not to any extent highlight disharmony identified 
in relation to tendering costs – it only highlights that this is a problem in general – which of 
course is not entirely new but needs to be considered as context for our study. 
 
Kumaraswamy et al (2004) highlight a discrepancy between demands for dramatic increases 
in productivity (Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and the UK are raised as key examples) 
and a desire for increased levels of innovation. Whilst the former is a boon to construction 
industry economic prospects, the increased demands and time pressures have a stifling affect 
on innovation – ‘dominant industry pressures to “get it right the first time” and to do this fast, 
direct participants towards already tried and tested procurement and operational routes’ 
(Kumaraswamy et al, 2004). Where increased demand could (and often does) promote 
innovation in the form of competition, niche finding and increased consumer discernment, 
the exemplified results in the construction industry run contrary to the beneficial potential.  
 
These ‘dominant industry pressures’ may have a parallel in terms of procurement policy. 
Conforming to policy requirements (and the varied requirements between levels of 
government) could be seen to be a stifling pressure – those with the procedures established to 
easily conform to policy in a specific area or state have an advantage in tendering; unless 
propensity toward innovation is evidenced from within the ‘conformist’ companies the ‘tried 
and tested’ will be the likely route (especially in risk averse environs). Additionally, even 
new and innovative companies may need to curb their own tendencies toward innovation as 
they, at least initially, mimic the ‘tried and tested’ to be competitive.  
 
Expensive and lengthy tendering processes with no guarantee of remuneration for effort 
expended, coupled with increasing time pressures and demands, can lead to a culture of 
‘doing things as they’ve always been done’. Innovation has the potential to increase the risk 
of tender failure for its high levels of inscrutability (fear of the unknown). For capital works 
procurement, it has been ‘suggested the costs of abortive tendering be borne more directly by 
the client, being the major recipient of the benefits accruing’ (Williamson et al, 2004). Whilst 
a whole research topic in itself, client reimbursement for unsuccessful tendering costs may 
increase the viability for smaller, more flexible and innovative contractors to offer tenders 
infeasible in circumstances that generally favour larger, institutional, established and more 
conservative players. ‘Cost’ must also be considered in non-fiscal terms – limiting innovation 
can be a demonstrated cost of the tendering process. Conforming to policy requirements and 
the varied requirements between levels of government could be a stifling pressure – those 
with the procedures established to easily conform to policy in a specific area or state have an 
advantage in tendering; unless propensity toward innovation is evidenced from within the 
‘conformist’ companies, the ‘tried and tested’ will be the likely route, especially in risk 
averse environs.  
 
Additionally, innovative tenders have the potential to be implicitly non-conforming tenders 
(Wood, 2006). Thus innovation is either stifled, or tenderers are required to submit 
alternative tenders alongside conforming tenders, thus adding to tendering cost. Prospects for 
a two- or multi-staged tendering process demanding innovation have been raised (Wood, 
2006). Initial calls for expressions of interest by innovators (EOII) concerning a broadly 
defined project can be used to refine requirements, reassess priorities and promote innovative 
practices. Once initial stages of filtering innovations versus requirements are completed, a 
refined tender request can be forwarded to shortlisted or prequalified tenderers for second-
stage tendering incorporating identified and desirable innovative practices. This can also have 
the effect of 'levelling the playing field' (English & Guthrie, 2003) and allowing a more 
objective comparison of tenders based on a more quantifiable base standard of innovation and 
cost. A potential downside, however, is the loss of competitive edge by the avant garde 
innovator, whose first-stage innovations are then taken as the basis for further stages of 
competitive tender (ie the 'secret' is broadcast). Such divulgence requires benevolence 
potentially lacking in a culture of competition and adversarial relationships. Whilst basic 
standards of innovation may be increased, the best innovations may not surface at all in a 
two-stage process for fear of losing competitive ground in future projects. 
 
  
3. Conceptualisation 
 
The transition from rigid rule-based procurement methodology to a value-based system that 
enables the exercise of discretion in procurement spending requires clarity in definition and 
interpretation, and transparency and communication of those interpretations. Rules can help 
produce good decisions that can help an organization to do its substantive job better. If an 
organization has learned that certain approaches to dealing with recurring situations work, it 
can use rules to ‘codify and transmit such information’ (Kelman, 2005). This project has the 
potential to identify areas in Australian procurement policy where the ability to exercise 
discretion under a value-based system conflicts with a lack of expertise, education or clear 
and binding guidance. Ongoing monitoring and evaluation of a balance or synthesis between 
regulation and discretionary freedom are required to achieve policy harmony. 
 
Figure 1 ‘Problem Conceptualisation of Harmony in Procurement Policy’ summarises the key 
issues identified to date. It also maps out the next stage of our work which is to confirm the 
problems in relation to differences between various jurisdictions through a national survey. 
We aim to find, according to industry and government practitioners, what the causes for 
policy disharmony and harmony are, and what constitute the key impediments to or catalysts 
for harmony in relation to procurement policy. 
 
 
Figure 1. Problem Conceptualisation of Harmony in Procurement Policy 
 
The areas of concern identified in the literature review, policy analysis and anecdotal 
evidence suggest the following key areas are worthy of investigation; 
1. Devolution and decentralisation: skills, training, philosophy, interpretation; 
2. Risk: tender evaluation criteria, value for money, project procurement strategy 
interpretations, rules vs. situational decision making; 
3. Cost of tendering: tender documentation, length of tendering; and 
4. Competition: accreditation thresholds. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Although there is considerable literature on procurement policy, the review has highlighted a 
lack of an analysis on the impacts to the construction industry business environment of the 
decision-making behavioural differences between government jurisdictions, specifically 
targeting procurement policy, process and practice. Ongoing research into discrepancies 
between procurement policies at various levels of jurisdiction has highlighted potential areas 
for conflict, divided into pre- and post-tender categories. In the pre-tender stage, Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs), purchasing thresholds, tender evaluation, ‘value for money’, 
supporting documentation requirements and tendering timelines are key areas for potential 
conflict. During post-tender stages, contract management, claims and dispute resolution are 
identified as critical areas. The resolution or harmonisation of these areas may enhance 
prospects for construction innovation. What is needed now, however, is an understanding of 
the current regulatory environment as understood by government and industry stakeholders 
conducting daily business in the capital works procurement arena. It is anticipated that this 
real-world analysis will aid in the consolidation of constructs arising from the anecdotal 
evidence, literature and policy analysis. 
 
The costs of procurement inefficiencies to the construction industry and government clients 
are high. Tendering evaluation, contractor selection, procurement methodology selection and 
construction management in capital works projects inherently involve huge financial 
commitments; even small gains in procurement efficiency have a large effect on involved 
parties. In addition to fiscal benefits, it is hoped that the streamlining of procurement policy 
and procedure will provide the required impetus to achieve innovative results in capital works 
procurement. 
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